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To meet aviation’s CO2 emission reduction targets while maintaining mobility in the face 
of increasing effective fuel costs, technology innovation will be required. The single aisle 
commercial aircraft market segment is the largest by quantity and value, but has the longest 
running product lines. New aircraft programs offer the largest potential gains in fuel 
efficiency, but are risky and require large capital investments. Re-engining existing 
airframes reduces risk and capital requirements, but offers lower potential fuel burn 
improvements. Incremental improvements to existing aircraft lines may entail the lowest 
risk. It is hypothesized that competition has important effects on manufacturers’ decisions to 
innovate and that these effects must be considered when designing policies to reduce CO2 
emissions from aviation. An aircraft program valuation model is developed to estimate 
expected payoffs to manufacturers under different competitive scenarios. A game theory 
analysis demonstrates how the incentives for manufacturers to innovate may be altered by 
subsidies, technology forcing regulations, increased effective fuel costs, the threat of new 
entrants, and long-term competitive strategies. It is shown that increased competition may 
result in incumbent manufacturers producing re-engined aircraft while increased effective 
fuel costs may result in new aircraft programs. Incumbents’ optimal strategies may be to 
delay the entry into service of new single aisle aircraft until 2020-24, unless technology 
forcing regulations are implemented. 
I. Introduction 
O meet CO2 emission reduction targets while maintaining mobility in the face of increasing effective fuel costs, 
technology innovation will be required. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has resolved to 
achieve an annual average fuel efficiency improvement of 2% until 2050 (ICAO, 2010) while IATA’s 2050 
aspirational goal is to reduce CO2 emissions from aviation by 50%. Effective fuel cost increase expected from 
tightening oil supply and market-based carbon constraint policies will provide economic incentives for airlines to 
reduce fuel burn, but Morrell and Dray (2009) argue that fuel cost increase may have a smaller than expected effect 
on CO2 emission reductions. The mean fuel burn of aircraft deliveries is affected by the introduction of new aircraft 
models with improved fuel efficiency. Therefore, increasing the rate of technology development is a useful policy 
lever for reducing emissions through fleet turnover. To do so, manufacturers must have the incentives to innovate. 
The purpose of this paper is to perform a game theoretic analysis of competition between large commercial aircraft 
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manufacturers to demonstrate how changes to a symmetric duopoly market may incentivize the introduction of new 
single aisle aircraft with fuel efficiency improvements. 
 
A. Aircraft Fuel Efficiency Improvements 
 Historically, jet aircraft fuel intensity has 
improved 1.2-2.2% per year on a seat-km basis, 
which is not sufficient to counter projected 
annual increases in demand for air transport of 
4-6% (Lee et. al., 2001). While the IPCC 
(1999) cited a 70% improvement in aircraft 
fuel efficiency since the 1960s, their analysis 
focused on the largest wide body aircraft that 
are generally more efficient due to economies 
of scale. The last piston-powered aircraft were 
as fuel efficient as the current average jet 
(Peeters and Hoolhorst, 2005). Single aisle 
aircraft currently make up 61% of the world’s 
jet fleet and 68% of forecasted deliveries over 
the next 20 years (Boeing, 2010). Therefore, to 
reduce fleet wide fuel burn, single aisle aircraft 
efficiency improvements will be required.  
 Using sales-weighted average aircraft fuel burn, Rutherford and Zeinali (2009) demonstrated efficiency 
improvements have stalled since 2000, as shown in Figure 1. The 1980s marked a period of fierce competition 
between Boeing, Airbus, Lockheed and McDonnell Douglas, resulting in more rapid efficiency improvements. 
Although as technology improves, reducing fuel burn becomes more technically challenging. It is hypothesized that 
competition between aircraft and engine manufacturers is a primary driver of innovation, including fuel efficiency 
improvements. Therefore, to understand what policies are likely to be effective at reducing aircraft fuel intensity, the 
effects of competition must be understood.  
 
B. Single Aisle Aircraft Manufacturer Market Structure 
 As an industry with economies 
of scale, large capital requirements, 
high technical capabilities, and a 
worldwide service network, large 
commercial aircraft manufacturing 
is a naturally concentrated industry. 
Since Boeing’s purchase of 
McDonnell Douglas in 1997, Airbus 
and Boeing have competed in a 
global duopoly. Large barriers to 
entry exist which protect the 
incumbents from new competition. 
The estimated cost of developing 
new aircraft ranges from $3 to $14 
billion, depending on the aircraft 
size and technology level, and 
requires expertise only developed 
over long periods of time. 
 Airlines purchasing new aircraft 
demand low operating costs and 
competitive pricing. Fleet 
commonality reduces operating and maintenance costs, as well as spare part inventories, providing incentives for 
airlines to lock in to aircraft families. In order to maintain market share, manufacturers must produce aircraft that 
match or exceed the competition’s performance. If one manufacturer develops a superior aircraft, it can gain 
significant market share, as shown in Figure 2. In the 150-185 seat single aisle short- to medium-range market 
segment, Boeing’s 727-200 enjoyed a monopoly until the MD-80 entered service in 1980. Among other 
Figure 1: Sales-Weighted Average Jet Aircraft Fuel Burn, 1960-2008. 
Source: Rutherford and Zeinali, 2009 
Figure 2: Single Aisle, 150-185 Seat Market Shares and Fuel burn Performance, 
1980-2009 (MD-80 baseline). Data Source: Boeing (2010), Airbus (2010), Piano-X. 
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advancements, the MD-80 offered a 35-40% fuel efficiency improvement (not shown). Boeing’s 737-400 and 
Airbus’s A320 entered service in 1988, again offering significant performance improvements over the incumbent, 
capturing market share. McDonnell-Douglas exited the market in 1997, leaving the two remaining manufacturers to 
split the market. Since the late 1990s when Boeing introduced the derivative 737-800 and 737-900 models, the 
competitors have performed incremental improvements on their existing product lines.  
 New competitors in single aisle markets are on the horizon. Embraer’s E195 encroaches on the 100+ seat market 
while Bombardier’s CSeries is scheduled to enter service in 2013 with 110-145 seat variants. Commercial Aircraft 
Corporation of China (Comac) is planning to introduce its 168-190 seat C919 in 2016 while Russia’s United Aircraft 
Corporation is developing the 150-210 seats MC-21 family for entry into service 2015-16. Engine manufacturers are 
developing geared turbofan and high by-pass ratio engines that will power the new entrants’ aircrafts and will enable 
incumbent manufacturers to improve their existing aircraft performance. In November 2010, Airbus announced its 
decision to offer a new engine option on its A320 family of aircraft for entry into service in 2016. After Airbus 
logged over 1000 orders for re-engined aircraft, Boeing followed suit in July 2011. As new entrant aircraft models 
prove their value, Airbus and Boeing may again choose to update their single aisle offerings to gain performance 
advantages, creating opportunities to reduce the environmental impacts of aviation. 
 
C. Paper Overview 
 The research focus and approach are discussed in Section II while Section III introduces the structure of the 
game analyzed. Estimates of the rank order of payoffs for manufacturers are presented to evaluate the impact of 
competition and other market factors on new aircraft performance. In Section IV, an aircraft program valuation 
model is developed based on publicly available data. The valuation model is then used in Section V to identify 
factors and policies that may shift the competitive equilibrium. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section VI. 
II. Research Approach and Assumptions 
 It is hypothesized that in a duopoly market where both manufacturers have existing single aisle aircraft families 
and fuel prices are low, neither competitor has an incentive to produce a clean sheet design aircraft. Although a new 
aircraft line can be designed to offer large performance improvements, it requires a significant research, 
development, testing and evaluation investment, is technically risky, and may cannibalize the sales of existing 
overlapping product lines. The existence of production learning curves with steady or increasing deliveries allows 
manufacturers to produce and sell initial aircraft at a net loss in order to gain the experience required to improve 
production processes and reduce unit costs to achieve profitability as volumes rise (Benkard, 2000). As the effects of 
the learning curve are negated with the introduction of a new line, the incentive to do so is reduced. Our research 
focuses on the factors or policies that may change the dynamics of aircraft manufacturer competition to incentivize 
the development of a new aircraft and to compare these factors on the basis of expected impact on fleet carbon 
emissions. 
 We chose a game theoretic framework as it accounts for the presence of multiple competitors, all of whom make 
rational decisions in accordance with their own best interests. Further, it is assumed that all players know that all 
other players make rational decisions. These assumptions enable the discovery of the Nash equilibrium of competing 
players’ strategies. The Nash equilibrium is the predicted strategy for each player that is the best response to the 
predicted strategy of all other players (Gibbons, 1992). Game theory frameworks have previously been used 
successfully to analyze competition between aircraft manufacturers. Brander and Spencer (1985) showed how 
government subsidies could be used to change the initial conditions of games between non-cooperative international 
rivals. Krugman (1987) used hypothetical payoff matrices to show how government subsidies could enable domestic 
firms to increase profits in excess of the subsidy amounts by deterring foreign entry and allowing domestic firms to 
capture excess returns, increasing social welfare. 
 The research approach is three staged. First, we construct static and dynamic game structures for a two- and 
three-player market. Second, an aircraft program valuation model is developed to estimate payoffs to manufacturers 
under different market share, fuel price, and demand scenarios. Third, a game theory analysis is used to model 
competitive forces impacting manufacturer decisions. Understanding how competition impacts the decision to invest 
in new aircraft designs may assist policy makers in developing regulatory mechanisms to improve aviation’s fuel 
efficiency and can inform expectations of the introduction of new aircraft for global aviation emission models. We 
test policy options to determine their outcomes in a competitive market, based on the assumptions in the valuation 
model. 
 The purpose of this analysis is not to determine aircraft manufacturers’ profitability, but to estimate the rank 
ordering of payoffs to determine how changes in the market structure may change the equilibrium game outcome 
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using a consistent framework for comparison. Unfortunately, such analysis is hindered by the proprietary nature of 
aircraft program economic data. We use reasonable assumptions based on publicly available data sources as proxies. 
A sensitivity analysis on those assumptions allows us to determine the extent to which they impact our findings.  
Both Airbus and Boeing have complete product lines that span all 100+ seat market segments. Decisions within 
one market segment are constrained by the state of products in other market segments. Limited engineering 
resources and capital have historically prevented manufacturers from undertaking more than one major aircraft 
design program at any one time. This analysis neglects this complexity, assuming manufacturers make decisions 
regarding the single aisle market without constraints imposed by decisions regarding the twin aisle markets. Benkard 
(2004) developed an empirical dynamic oligopoly model of the wide-bodied commercial aircraft industry used to 
analyze industry pricing, aircraft production costs, aircraft performance, and policy. He assumed that unobservable 
aircraft characteristics that are known to buyers (i.e. quality) result from a stochastic Markov process that he 
empirically estimated to determine that they do not affect production costs. Benkard’s quality parameter and engine 
number were used as proxies for fuel efficiency. Our approach does not follow an empirical econometric analysis. 
Rather, we focus on actual fuel efficiencies under varying external conditions to estimate the expected demand 
preference among aircraft lines offered by competing manufacturers. 
The aircraft performance parameter of interest in this paper is fuel intensity - the energy consumed per unit of 
output. As a proxy, the fuel burn per seat mile is used. Efficiency improvements indicate reductions in fuel intensity. 
III. Structure of the Single Aisle Aircraft Competitive Game 
 Boeing and Airbus have existing single 
aisle aircraft in production. As incumbent 
manufacturers, they have three generic 
strategies: (1) maintain their existing product 
lines, with incremental improvements over 
time, (2) re-engine their existing airframes, 
enabling superior performance improvements, 
or (3) develop new, clean sheet design aircraft 
that offer the greatest fuel burn improvements. 
For the static games (outlined in Figure 3) 
manufacturers make their decision to proceed 
at the beginning of the time period examined. 
It is assumed that there is a 5-year delay from 
when a decision is made to when the aircraft 
enters service. Therefore, a decision to 
develop a new aircraft includes the production 
and sale of the existing aircraft for 5-years 
until the new aircraft enters service. Although the development time for a re-engined aircraft may be less than for a 
new aircraft, it is assumed to be the same to simplify the structure of the game into four 5-year stages. A 20-year 
period of analysis was selected for the static games to correspond to market and fuel price forecasts.  
Static games enable an understanding of current factors impacting manufacturer decisions, but in reality players 
are engaged in a long-term game that extends beyond the 20-year horizon. Dynamic games were investigated in 
which manufacturers update their decisions at 5-year increments, based on the evolution of fuel prices and demand 
for single aisle aircraft. As shown in Figure 3, it was assumed that incumbent manufacturers would enter a new 
aircraft into service by the fourth stage (2025-29). Therefore, in the dynamic game, the maintain strategy includes 
deciding to proceed with a new aircraft in the third stage (2020-24) for entry into service in the fourth stage (2025-
29). It is assumed that a manufacturer would produce a re-engined aircraft for at least 10-years to receive a sufficient 
payback on their investment. Therefore, in the dynamic game the re-engine strategy includes the decision to proceed 
with a re-engined aircraft and a new aircraft, 10-years later. The dynamic games lead to a new strategy in which 
manufacturers delay the entry into service of a new aircraft until the third stage (2020-24), deciding to continue to 
maintain their existing aircraft until that time. For each strategy, it is assumed that a player’s game terminates when 
they decide to develop a new aircraft. A 30-year period is used for the dynamic games to allow for the new aircraft 
investment made in the later stages to be repaid. 
Figure 3: Structure of Static and Dynamic Games. 
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Each strategy has a different impact on the 
fuel efficiency improvement of a new aircraft. 
Based on historical data, incremental 
improvements to an existing aircraft line 
generally amount to ~1% annual fuel intensity 
reductions. Re-engining is expected to offer a 
one-time step fuel efficiency improvement of up 
to 15% (Airbus, 2010). Finally, new aircraft with 
a clean sheet design could potentially offer a step 
fuel efficiency improvement on the order of 25% 
(ACARE, 2008; Morrell and Dray, 2009). These 
efficiency improvements are indicated in Figure 
4. As technologies mature, clean sheet design 
aircraft in the future will offer greater efficiency 
improvements, expected to reach up to 70% over 
the current fleet average by 2040 (Kar, 2010). 
NASA’s Environmentally Responsible Aviation 
(ERA) goals include developing technologies 
that will enable 70% or better fuel burn 
performance on clean sheet design aircraft by 
2025. Therefore, in the long term there is a 
performance advantage to delay the release of a new aircraft. Due to payback periods on the order of 10-15 years for 
large commercial aircraft programs, when a manufacturer commits to a new aircraft, they lock-in to the technology 
level for the duration of the program, only enabling incremental improvements on the order of 1% per year. The 
strategy set generates an envelope that locks an aircraft program to a technology level.  
Figure 4 shows illustrative fuel efficiency improvement pathways based on the sequence of re-engine 2015 
+new 2025 for Manufacturer A and new 2020 for Manufacturer B. If Manufacturer A decides to re-engine in 2010, 
the aircraft would enter service around 2015, providing a performance advantage over Manufacturer B’s product. 
But, if Manufacturer B decided to develop a new aircraft around 2015, they would gain the performance advantage 
around 2020 when it enters service. Locking into a technology level may leave a competitor vulnerable to their 
aircraft becoming obsolete before profitable, unable to benefit from reduced unit production costs through learning 
effects. Aircraft that have superior performance gain market share and yield higher sale prices. Although 
manufacturers can increase market share to an extent by dropping sale price, this strategy reduces profitability. 
When designing an aircraft, the manufacturer must balance a variety of criteria of which fuel burn is just one. 
Aircraft are generally optimized for one speed, altitude, stage length, payload, and fuel price. Fuel prices are 
volatile, resulting in uncertainty about the dollar value of efficiency improvements. The Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) forecasts jet fuel prices to increase to $2.93/gallon by 2020, with low and high scenarios of  
$1.53 and $4.72. Design compromises are inevitable, as in the A380’s airport handling constraint of an 80m 
wingspan, resulting in an 11% increase in fuel burn over optimal (Peeters and Hoolhorst, 2005). 
Moreover, the demand for new aircraft is volatile, impacted by GDP growth, macroeconomic cycles, and 
passenger preferences. Manufacturers must build production facilities and supply chains with the flexibility to meet 
expected demand, but decisions based on optimistic forecasts may result in severe financial consequences while 
overly pessimistic forecasts can limit the potential upside of an aircraft program. These sources of uncertainty are 
included in the dynamic games investigated. In the next section, the aircraft program valuation model used to 
estimate the payoffs of the competitive game is introduced. 
IV. Methodology for Aircraft Program Valuation  
To find the expected competitive equilibriums in the static and dynamic games, an estimation of the payoffs to 
the players is required. An aircraft program valuation model was developed, based on assumptions found in the 
literature and publicly available data. The purpose of the valuation model is not to determine the profits 
manufacturers can expect to receive, but rather to determine the rank ordering of expected payoffs under different 
competitive scenarios. To determine the Nash equilibrium of the game, the rank ordering of payoffs is required - not 
absolute values. A sensitivity analysis is performed in Section IV J to determine whether the rank ordering of 
payoffs remain constant for the expected range of input values, and to which parameters the model is most sensitive. 
 
Figure 4: Conceptual Model of Future Potential Fuel Burn 
Improvements due to Technological Advancements.  
Hypothetical efficiency improvements over current single aisle aircraft.  
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As in Irwin and Pavcnik (2004), we assume the objective function of each firm f is to maximize the net present 
value of expected profits ! at time t: 
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where Et is the expectation operator conditional on information at time t, " is the discount factor, qt is the quantity of 
aircraft sold (which is a product of firm market share and total market size), pt is the unit sale price, ct is the variable 
cost of production, and It is the nonrecurring investment. This objective function is expected for nongovernmental 
firms operating in market economies. Firms operating in other types of economies may choose different objective 
functions, but this complexity is not investigated in this paper. A symmetric duopoly is assumed in which firms have 
the same cost and revenue functions. The static analysis was limited to a 20-year period as manufacturers release 20-
year demand forecasts and discounting reduces the present value of future cash flows, while the dynamic game was 
extended to a 30-year period to enable manufacturers to book revenues from aircraft that enter into service later in 
the game. The periods of analysis were broken into five-year stages to reduce the number of states considered, 
making the problem tractable. Forecasted demand and fuel prices represent average values over the course of a 
business cycle. The objective function in equation 1 is expanded in parts A through I and the model input parameters 
are summarized in Table 5.  
 
A. Nonrecurring Investments 
 Aircraft program nonrecurring investments consist of the research, development, testing and evaluation 
(RDT&E) of the aircraft. This includes the design, prototypes, flight testing, production facility construction, and 
tooling that is required to produce the first plane that enters commercial service. While this analysis assumes 
symmetric firms, due to past design decisions, Boeing’s 737 requires additional engineering work to re-engine. The 
737 sits lower to the ground than the A320. New geared turbo fan high bypass ratio engines are heavier and the inlet 
diameter is larger than the traditional CFM56 that power the aircraft. To model this difference, it was assumed that 
Player B requires a greater investment to re-engine its aircraft than Player A. It was assumed that nonrecurring costs 
are distributed over one 5-year stage. Estimates of the investment required were taken from industry press, based on 
historical programs. 
 
B. Recurring Costs of Production 
 The recurring cost of manufacturing aircraft are subject to a learning curve that incentivizes manufacturers early 
in a program to produce more, reducing unit production costs. Raymer (2006) uses the learning curve model: 
 
               
! 
cqi = c1qi
ln " / ln 2          (2) 
 
where cqi is the unit production cost of the ith unit produced, c1 is the theoretical first unit cost, qi is the number of 
units produced, and # is the learning curve slope.  
The learning curve slope has been estimated to be between 75-95%, with 80% generally accepted based on 
empirical analysis and expert opinion (Benkard, 2004; Irwin and Pavcnik, 2004). The theoretical first unit cost was 
estimated using the DAPCA IV model, developed by the RAND Corporation using a statistical analysis of past 
commercial and military aircraft programs (Raymer, 2006). The estimated unit cost of the 100th aircraft produced 
was used to estimate the theoretical unit cost of the first, based on the learning curve slope assumption, in the same 
manner as Markish (2002). 
The initial quantity of units produced for the maintain strategy was estimated from historical deliveries. To the 
end of 2009, Boeing had 1806 deliveries of their 737-800 while Airbus had delivered 2257 A320s. For the re-engine 
strategy, it was assumed that the manufacturer would benefit from significant learning effects due to a long history 
of producing the air frame, but the learning curve would be reset to some lower number of units produced due to the 
design and production changes required. The initial quantity of units produced for the re-engine strategy was set at a 
level where the estimated unit production cost approximated sale price. 
 
C. Demand Forecast 
 The global demand for single aisle aircraft was forecasted as yearly deliveries, for each 5-year stage, using a 
recombinant binomial lattice model. Although this method assumes a lognormal distribution, it limited the number 
of states in the model while recognizing the uncertainty inherent in forecasting future demand. For each stage of the 
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lattice model, the average demand over the next 5-year stage could increase by amount u or decrease by amount d 
with probability p or 1-p, respectively. The values for u, d, and p were estimated from historical delivery data using 
the formulas in equation 3 (Chance, 2007): 
 
    
! 
u = e" #t    
! 
d = e"# $t     
! 
p = e
"#t $ d
u $ d      (3) 
 
where $ is the delivery variance, % is the expected mean 
growth rate of deliveries, and !t is the number of periods. 
The variance was calculated from the 2000-09 deliveries of 
MD-80/90, Boeing 737-800/900 and Airbus A320. High and 
low estimates were calculated using the periods 1990-2009 
and 2005-09. The mean growth rate was calculated so that the 
expected deliveries over the next 20-years equaled the 
average of the Airbus and Boeing 2010-29 single aisle market 
forecasts. High and low estimates were calculated using the 
two manufacturer’s independent forecasts. Each state of the 
lattice model in Table 1 represents the average expected 
deliveries over the 5-year period, beginning in the year 
indicated. The initial state represents the average deliveries in 
the period 2005-09. 
 
D. Fuel Price Forecast Model 
 The expected price of jet fuel influences airlines’ 
willingness to invest in fuel burn reducing technology. It is 
assumed that if fuel prices are expected to escalate, airlines 
will be more willing to invest in new aircraft that reduce fuel 
burn. Therefore, the expected price of fuel influences the 
prices airlines and leasing companies are willing to pay for 
new aircraft and the amount of risk manufacturers are willing 
to take to implement fuel efficiency technologies. Fuel prices 
were modeled in the same manner as demand using a 
binomial lattice model. The mean growth rate was taken from 
the Energy Information Administration’s (EIA) 2010 Annual 
Energy Outlook while the variance was determined from 
historical jet fuel data. High and low estimates were taken 
from the different EIA oil price scenarios. 
 
E. Aircraft Lifecycle Cost Analysis 
 Airline purchase decisions are modeled using an aircraft 
lifecycle cost analysis. The model was developed using 
assumptions based on Morrell and Dray (2009), updated with 
average BTS (2009) operational and cost data for A320s and 
737-800s operated by US carriers, as shown in Table 3. The 
sale price of the aircraft represents ~20% of the present value 
of the lifecycle costs, as shown in Figure 5. Fuel can account 
for 33% of total aircraft related operating expenses (TAROC) 
using an 8% discount rate, the base fuel price scenario, and a 
20-year operating lifetime. Although these calculations are 
approximate, they demonstrate that for a rational agent, sale 
price is one component of the decision to purchase an aircraft 
while lifecycle operating costs is a larger share. A 
manufacturer that can reduce operating costs will be able to 
increase sale price within a range that keeps TAROC 
constant, or reduces it.  
 
Figure 5: A320/737-800 Lifecycle Cost Estimates  
Data Source: BTS (2010), Morrell and Dray (2009) 
Table 1: Aircraft Demand Base Case Lattice Model  
Data Source: Boeing, 2010; Airbus, 2010. 
 Stage 0 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 
 2005-09 2010-14 2015-19 2020-24 2025-29 
Aircraft 
Deliveries/Year 
391 738 1393 2630 4965 
 207 391 738 1393 
   110 207 391 
    58 110 
     31 
Probability 100% 47% 22% 10% 5% 
  53% 50% 35% 22% 
   28% 40% 37% 
    15% 28% 
     8% 
E(Deliveries/Year) 391 455 530 617 718 
Total, 2010-29 11,599     
 
Table 2: Jet Fuel Price Base Case Lattice Model 
Data Source: ATA, 2010; EIA, 2010. 
 Stage 0 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 
 2005-09 2010-14 2015-19 2020-24 2025-29 
Jet Fuel 
Price/Gallon 
 
$2.24 $4.58 $9.35 $19.12 $39.07 
 $1.10 $2.24 $4.58 $9.35 
  $0.54 $1.10 $2.24 
    $0.26 $0.54 
     $0.13 
Probability 100% 42% 18% 7% 3% 
  58% 49% 31% 17% 
   34% 42% 36% 
    20% 33% 
     11% 
E(Fuel Price) $2.24 $2.56 $2.92 $3.33 $3.80 
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F. Aircraft Sale Price 
 There are strong anecdotal reports of significant 
discounting in large commercial aircraft pricing 
(Newhouse, 2007). An analysis of Boeing and Airbus 
annual reports demonstrates that revenue has never 
matched the aircraft list prices of the aircraft delivered in 
any one year. The Airline Monitor (2004) reported 
average A320 and 737-800 sale prices of $53.3 and 
$49.4 million (2008 $), respectively. A 35% discount 
from list prices is assumed, yielding an estimated base 
sale price of $50 million. 
 Markish (2002) demonstrated that there is no correlation between aircraft deliveries and sale price. Therefore, it 
is assumed that market demand evolves independently of sale prices, while relative differences in competitor’s sale 
price combined with lifecycle operating costs (i.e. TAROC) impacts market shares. A market-based pricing model is 
assumed in which the aircraft price balances the other aircraft related operating costs. It is assumed that current 
aircraft prices remain constant in real terms, but manufacturers are able to negotiate price increases proportional to 
reductions in lifecycle cost on the introduction of new aircraft. Assuming a basic bargaining game in which both 
parties have equal power, lifecycle operating cost reductions would be split evenly between the buyer and seller. 
Therefore, if a new aircraft with 25% fuel burn improvement yields a present value of $20.8 million in lifecycle cost 
savings, it is assumed manufacturers would be able to increase sale price by $10.4 million. 
 
G. Market Share Model 
 Airlines are assumed to select the aircraft that gives them the highest utility. We assume manufacturers produce 
equivalent aircraft, with fuel burn the only differentiating factor. But, due to past fleet decisions, airlines have 
generally committed to one manufacturer’s product. Airlines prefer a fleet composed of aircraft from the same 
family to reduce training, maintenance, and spare part inventory costs. Therefore, airlines select the aircraft with the 
lowest TAROC, as long as the reduction of TAROC of the aircraft is greater than the aircraft family switching cost 
the airline may incur.  
 The world’s single aisle fleet is roughly split between the 737 and A320 families, with unfilled orders slightly 
favoring Airbus. It is expected that incremental improvements in the fuel efficiency of one manufacturer’s aircraft 
are not enough to convince airlines operating the competitor’s aircraft to switch. A substantial operating cost 
improvement is required relative to the competition to gain market share. Further, it is assumed that some airlines 
will never choose to switch manufacturers, leaving some minimum market share that a manufacturer will maintain 
as long as they choose to produce their aircraft.  
 Assuming airline’s switching costs are evenly 
distributed between 10% of the aircraft price and the 
reduction in TAROC resulting from a new aircraft, a 
historical analysis of narrow body and wide body market 
segments was used to determine the market share rules 
shown in Table 4. The minimum market share values 
were taken from the wide body market segments where 
Boeing’s 777 controls ~85% of the market vs. Airbus’s 
A340, and Airbus’s A330 takes ~85% of the market vs. 
Boeing’s 767. The market share assumption for the three 
player games are shown in the Appendix. It is assumed that a new entrant would take market share away from the 
incumbent manufacturers with the same rules as in the two-player game. 
 Without operating cost improvements, manufacturers could reduce TAROC by reducing the sale price, 
purchasing market share. This possibility is neglected in the model as it is assumed that manufacturers prefer to 
maintain a certain level of profitability on existing models. For new aircraft models, there is an incentive to reduce 
sale price to gain market share to increase production and work down the learning curve. This scenario is not 
considered in this model. 
 
H. Production Capacity Constraints and Fixed Costs 
 Increasing demand or market share would require a manufacturer to expand their production facilities. 
Production capacity is expanded at the beginning of each stage if the expected deliveries in the demand state exceed 
capacity. A one-time investment is made to expand capacity, but it is assumed that capacity is never lost. Therefore, 
Table 4: Two-Player Game Market Share Rules 
  Player B 
  Maintain Re-engine New 
Pl
ay
er
 A
 Maintain 50%, 50% 35%, 65% 15%, 85% 
Re-engine 65%, 35% 50%, 50% 35%, 65% 
New 85%, 15% 65%, 35% 50%, 50% 
 
Table 3: Aircraft Lifecycle Cost Model Inputs  
Variable Values Source 
Block Hours 3658 block hour/year BTS (2009) 
Fuel Burn 792 gallon/block hour  
Morrell and Dray 
(2009) 
Fuel Intensity 
Degradation 
     Year 1-5: 0% 
     Year 6-10: 0% 
     Year 11-15: 0% 
     Year 16-20: 0.5% 
Discount Rate 8%  
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if demand drops in the next stage, production capacity remains steady. It is assumed that manufacturers have fixed 
costs proportional to their production capacity. Therefore, if capacity is larger than demand at any stage, the 
manufacturer will be required to pay for excess capacity that is not utilized. Estimates of the expansion costs and 
fixed costs of unit production capacity (i.e. the ability to produce one aircraft per year) were derived from Boeing 
and Airbus annual reports.  
 
I. Expected Net Present Value Calculation 
 The values of the aircraft program valuation model input parameters as described in sections A-H are 
summarized in Table 5. The low and high values used in the sensitivity analysis performed in the next section are 
included to indicate the expected range of inputs. 
 
Table 5: Aircraft Program Valuation Model Assumptions 
Variable Low Base High Comments 
Investment, I – Maintain $0 $0 $0 Rothman (2010) 
Re-engine $1.0 ($1.0) $1.5 ($3.0) $3.0 ($6.0) Billion US$, <Airbus> (<Boeing>) 
New $5 $10 $15  
Learning Curve Slope, # 75% 80% 85% Benkard (2004) 
Theoretical First Unit Cost, c1 $260 $380 $500 Million US$, Raymer (2006) 
Year 0 Quantity, q0 – Maintain  2000   
Re-engine  300   
New  0   
Sale price, p – Maintain $40 $50 $60 Million US$ 
Re-engine $50 $56.6 $63.2 Million US$ 
New $50 $60.4 $70.8 Million US$ 
Expansion Costs $0 $20 $30 Million US$/unit capacity 
Fixed Costs of Capacity $0 $4 $6 Million US$/unit capacity 
Discount Rate 6% 8% 10%  
Single Aisle Market Demand, µ 2.36% 3.04% 3.66% Calculated based on Boeing (2010), Airbus 
(2010) data " 10.2% 28.4% 45.0% 
Jet Fuel Price, µ -0.23% 2.64% 4.59% Calculated based on EIA (2010) data 
" 22.0% 32.0% 42.8% Calculated based on ATA (2010) data 
 
To calculate the expected net present value E(NPV) of a manufacturer’s strategy, the NPV and probability of each 
possible path through the demand lattice model shown in Table 1 was calculated. E(NPV) was the sum of the 
probability of each path times its NPV. This approach was necessary as the path through the lattice model impacted 
the unit production cost (as the cost of any unit produced was dependent on how many previous units had been 
produced) and the fixed costs (as the production capacity was assumed to not contract).  
 
J. Sensitivity Analysis 
 A sensitivity analysis was performed to determine whether 
the aircraft program valuation model is robust, within the high 
and low range of input parameters listed in Table 5. Figure 6 
shows that the model is most sensitive to the learning curve 
slope and theoretical first unit cost (TFUC) assumptions. In 
comparison, the development cost and discount rate 
assumptions have little impact on the expected net present 
value of the new aircraft program.  
 The rank ordering of the three strategies in the static games 
(i.e. maintain, re-engine, and new) was tested to determine if 
changes the model’s inputs resulted in a change in the rank 
ordering of the decisions. Although the estimated value of the 
aircraft programs changed, the rank ordering of the payoffs did 
not, assuming a 50% market share. 
 Next, each high and low input value was tested individually to determine if it would change the outcome of the 
game, given the market share assumption in Table 4. The only parameters to change the outcome of the game were 
the low inputs for the learning curve slope and the theoretical first unit cost. By decreasing these values, the new 
aircraft option had a higher E(NPV), resulting in both players choosing to develop a new aircraft. No other 
 
Figure 6: Sensitivity of New Aircraft Program E(NPV) 
to Change in Input Assumptions. 
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parameters within the range investigated changed the outcome of the two-player game. A learning curve slope of 
75% is thought to be optimistic, so the sensitivity of the model to this parameter was considered to be acceptable. 
 The market share assumptions in Table 4 were tested to determine what magnitudes of changes were required to 
change the outcome of the game. Each superior performing aircraft market share assumption was varied between 
50% and 100%. The outcome of the game was only sensitive to the re-engine vs. maintain market share assumption. 
Using the base case input parameters, the outcome of the game remained the same for the range 50% to 77% for the 
re-engine vs. maintain market share assumption.  
 In general, the model was robust within the range of input parameters examined for the two-player game. The 
outcome of the game was only significantly changed by extreme input parameters. Therefore, it can be concluded 
that the aircraft valuation program models the competitive dynamics of the single aisle aircraft duopoly market 
robustly within the range of parameters indicated. 
V. Game Theory Analysis of Single Aisle Aircraft Competition 
The aircraft program valuation model developed was used to estimate the payoffs in nine games summarized in 
Table 6: 
 
Table 6: Overview of Games Played. 
E(Fuel Price) indicates the low fuel price (-) or increasing fuel price (+) scenarios. 
Game  Players  Type  E(Fuel Price) 
  2  3  Static  Dynamic  -  + 
1) Expectation of Low Fuel Prices  x    x    x   
2) Technology Forcing Regulations  x    x    x   
3) Manufacturer Subsidies  x    x    x   
4) Expectation of Increasing Fuel Prices  x    x      x 
5) New Entrant, -25% Fuel Intensity    x  x      x 
6) New Entrant, -15% Fuel Intensity    x  x      x 
7) Two-Player Dynamic Game  x      x    x 
8) New Entrant Dynamic Game, -25%    x    x    x 
9) New Entrant Dynamic Game, -15%    x    x    x 
 
Game 1 is the base case against which the other games are compared to understand how the scenario examined 
impacts the outcome of the game. Complexity is built up with each game, providing an understanding of how 
different factors change the expected outcome of the game. Two- and three-player games were analyzed to 
understand the impact of new competition on the current duopoly market. Static and dynamic games were used to 
show how long-term product line strategies might impact decisions made in the present. The expectation of future 
fuel prices had important impacts on the outcome of the games investigated. The first three games were played 
under the expectation of low fuel prices, while the remaining games assumed increasing fuel prices. Under the 
expectation of low fuel prices it is assumed that manufacturers are not able to raise the sale price of aircraft with fuel 
efficiency improvements, while the expectation of increasing fuel prices enables sale price increases (as described in 
Section IV F). 
This is a conceptual analysis in which players are assumed to be symmetric, except for the difference in re-
engining investment required, as described in Section IV A. Labeled A, B, and C, the players in the games are not 
meant to reflect real world manufacturers. Players A and B are incumbent manufacturers that have existing single 
aisle aircraft product lines, while Player C is a new competitor with the strategy set [Enter, Don’t Enter]. Normal 
form games are used to determine pure strategy Nash equilibriums. Underlined payoffs are the dominant pure 
strategies, given a competitor’s strategy. A Nash equilibrium occurs when both players’ payoffs dominate.  
 
A. Two-Player Static Games 
 
Game 1: Expectation of Low Fuel Prices 
Under the expectation of low fuel prices, incumbent 
manufacturers are not able to increase the sale price of a new 
aircraft as fuel cost savings are negligible over the course of the 
aircraft’s life. The incentive to develop a new aircraft is to gain 
market share from a competitor or to raise entrance barriers to 
protect against new entrants. Table 7 shows that the status quo 
Table 7: Low Fuel Prices Game 
billion 2010 US$ (Player <A>, <B>) 
  Player B 
  Maintain Re-engine New 
Pl
ay
er
 A
 Maintain 43, 43 32, 33 18, 29 
Re-engine 34, 32 25, 24 17, 16 
New 29, 17 16, 15 7, 7 
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is the competitive equilibrium. Both incumbents maintain their current aircraft, reaping large profits while splitting 
the market. The development of a new aircraft is strictly dominated for both players. This scenario provides a 
baseline against which scenarios explored in the next sections can be compared to understand their impacts. 
 
Game 2: Technology Forcing Regulations 
If low fuel prices are expected, a technology forcing regulation 
could be implemented to obsolete existing aircraft product lines, 
forcing manufacturers to re-engine or develop a new aircraft. 
Rutherford and Zeinali (2009) point out that if the standard 
applied to new aircraft types, grandfathering in existing 
production lines, the introduction of new aircraft designs may be 
delayed to avoid triggering the standard. It is assumed here that 
the regulation would force manufacturers to either exit the market, 
re-engine, or develop a new aircraft within a 5-year time frame 
(i.e. one stage in the valuation model). Exiting the market would be preceded by a phase-in period in which 
incumbent manufacturers sell their current product lines while replacements are developed, resulting in a positive 
exit payoff, as shown in Table 8. The predicted equilibrium is for manufacturers to harvest their existing product 
lines while making the minimum investment to meet the regulation by re-engining. Incumbent manufacturers would 
not have an incentive to make the larger investment required to develop a new aircraft in the near-term.  
In this scenario, the manufacturers’ payoffs are reduced by 40% from the low fuel price scenario. This suggests 
that manufacturers have a significant incentive to lobby against technology forcing regulations that would obsolete 
their existing product lines unless the regulations yield additional benefits for the incumbents. Games 5 and 6 
introduce a new entrant to the market. Increased competition may further erode manufacturer payoffs as the market 
is split between three competitors instead of two. Although technology-forcing regulations may force incumbents to 
move, they have the additional effect of raising market entrance barriers by requiring higher technology levels that 
favor entrenched incumbent manufacturers. Therefore, under the threat of a new market entrant, incumbent 
manufacturers may use their political power to seek regulations that raise entrance barriers, creating a situation of 
regulatory capture in which government action protects incumbents at the expense of new competition (Stigler, 
1971).  
 
Game 3: Manufacturer Subsidies 
 Aircraft manufacturers have traditionally received 
substantial direct and indirect subsidies. The rationale by 
governments has been to support their national champion to 
gain a larger global market share and induce spillover effects in 
related domestic industries whose value exceed the amount of 
the subsidy (Krugman, 1987; Busch, 2001). If so inclined, 
governments would likely provide matching subsidies, 
preventing their national champion from losing their 
competitive advantage in the global market.  
 To incentivize the development of a new aircraft, the payoff for a new-maintain strategy must be greater than the 
payoff for a maintain-maintain strategy. Based on our model’s assumptions and the expectation of low fuel prices, 
governments would need to provide new aircraft subsidies on the order of  $15 billion to increase the new-maintain 
payoff to shift the competitive equilibrium, as shown by comparison of Table 9 and Table 7.  
 Krugman (1987) argues that free trade is the best rule of thumb. Gains from intervention are limited by 
uncertainty over the correct policies (as the exact payoffs in the real world are uncertain) and by general equilibrium 
effects (as promoting one sector diverts resources from others). Further, past subsidies have threatened trade wars 
between the United States and the European Union. Adverse political consequences could outweigh potential gains. 
Therefore, while subsidies may result in the production of an aircraft with improved fuel efficiency, subsidies could 
prove to be a potentially dangerous policy option that negatively impacts other sectors of each country’s economy 
through increased trade barriers. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9: Manufacturer Subsidies Game 
$15 billion subsidy provided for new aircraft 
  Player B 
  Maintain Re-engine New 
Pl
ay
er
 A
 Maintain 43, 43 32, 33 18, 44 
Re-engine 34, 32 25, 24 17, 31 
New 44, 17 31, 15 22, 22 
 
Table 8: Technology Forcing Regulations Game 
  Player B 
  Exit Re-engine New 
Pl
ay
er
 A
 Exit 11, 11 11, 57 11, 39 
Re-engine 59, 11 25, 24 17, 16 
New 39, 11 16, 15 7, 7 
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 Game 4: Expectation of Increasing Fuel Prices 
Under the expectation of high effective fuel prices (due to 
market forces and/or carbon pricing policies), it is assumed that 
manufacturers are able to increase the sale price of new aircraft 
that reduce fuel burn. The expected lifecycle fuel cost savings 
are split between the airline and manufacturer, as described in 
Section IV F. Therefore, a new aircraft program yields 
increased revenue for the manufacturer, but requires a large 
capital investment and significant demand to reduce unit costs 
by working down the production learning curve. If demand 
does not develop as expected, this can be a risky endeavor. Table 10 demonstrates that the increased revenue from 
increased sale price provides the incentive required to shift the equilibrium to a new aircraft for both players. 
 This game is a Prisoner’s Dilemma - each player would be better off maintaining their current aircraft, but each 
has an incentive to deviate, resulting in reduced payoffs for both. Implicit or explicit collusion between the 
incumbents could result in the manufacturers both maintaining their current aircraft, receiving the highest combined 
payoffs, but testing airlines’ and governments’ willingness to accept competitive distortions. Collusion would result 
in technology levels stagnating, providing an opportunity for new entrants to develop a competitive aircraft that 
could take market share away from the incumbents, as discussed in the next section. In fact, the manufacturer 
subsidies examined in Game 3 resulted in a Prisoner’s Dilemma as well, but the dilemma was induced by 
government intervention. Competitive forces induce the dilemma in Game 4. 
This scenario assumes a ~20% increase in new aircraft sale prices, resulting in a significant transfer of capital 
from airlines and leasing companies to manufacturers. Increased capital requirements would be offset by reduced 
airline operating costs over time, but it is uncertain whether additional capital is available for the airlines. The airline 
industry is highly competitive and has historically had limited profits. Undercapitalization of airlines could stall the 
introduction of new aircraft models by manufacturers. 
For the remainder of the games examined in this paper, the expectation of increasing fuel costs using the base 
case values shown in Table 2 were used to calculate the expected aircraft sale price increase over the base price. 
 
B. Three-Player Static Games 
With a new entrant, the game changes from a single move 
to two moves, as shown in Figure 7. In the first move, Player C 
decides whether or not to enter the market. In the second move, 
the incumbent manufacturers simultaneously choose their best 
response to the new entrant’s strategy. To deter Player C from 
entering the market, the incumbents could send credible threats 
of developing a new aircraft that is superior to the new 
entrant’s. Further, the new entrant could send a threat forcing the incumbents to decide their optimal strategy given 
their perceived probability of a new competitor entering the market. For this analysis, it is assumed that Player A 
and B decide their optimal strategy given Player C’s decision to enter the market. Given this outcome, Player C 
would decide whether or not to enter. Therefore, if Player C expected a negative E(NPV) given Player A and B’s  
expected response to the new entrant, Player C would decide to not enter the market, making the game a two-player 
game, as discussed in Games 1 to 4. Games 5 and 6 demonstrate that the performance of the new entrant’s aircraft 
impacts the outcome of the game. An aircraft with superior performance would capture a greater market share, 
reducing the incumbents’ payoffs further. 
 
Game 5: New Entrant, -25% Fuel Intensity 
If the new entrant’s aircraft has superior performance to 
the incumbents’, the incumbents would expect to lose a 
significant number of sales, providing them with an incentive 
to develop a new aircraft. Assuming that sale prices are 
increased to reflect lifecycle fuel cost savings under the 
increasing effective fuel price scenario (as in Game 4) and 
that the new entrant produces a new aircraft that meets the 
performance of the incumbent’s new aircraft option (i.e. a 
25% fuel burn improvement), Table 11 shows that an 
equilibrium may exist in which one incumbent chooses to 
Table 11: New Entrant, -25% Fuel Intensity 
billion 2010 US$ (Player <A>, <B>, <C>) 
  Player B 
  Maintain Re-engine New 
Pl
ay
er
 A
 
Maintain 17.1, 17.1, 
29 
17.1, 16,  
20 
17.1, 17.3, 
5 
Re-
engine 
17.5, 17.1, 
20 
17.5, 16,  
11 
17.5, 13,  
1 
New 17.3, 17.1, 
5 
13, 16,  
1 
9.5, 9.5,  
-2.4 
 
 
Figure 7: New Entrant Extended Form Game 
Table 10: Increasing Fuel Prices Game 
  Player B 
  Maintain Re-engine New 
Pl
ay
er
 A
 Maintain 43, 43 32, 48 17, 60 
Re-engine 50, 32 37, 35 24, 39 
New 60, 17 39, 23 25, 25 
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maintain while the other decides to re-engine. Although this equilibrium is sensitive to the input parameters in the 
aircraft program valuation model, the greater investment required by Player B to re-engine results in an off-
symmetric equilibrium. The superior performance of the new entrant’s aircraft captures a significant market share 
while Player A attempts to maintain market share by re-engining. Player B’s optimal strategy is to avoid the 
investment and maintain its current aircraft. Once the competitors’ new and re-engined aircraft enter service in stage 
2, Player B suffers from a greatly reduced market share, but continues to make small profits due to its unit 
production cost advantage while harvesting its existing product line. The new entrant has a positive expected net 
present value in each possible outcome, except if both of the incumbents develop a new aircraft. This result suggests 
that there may be rents available in the single aisle market, providing an incentive for increased competition if new 
entrants are able to overcome the significant entrance barriers to develop an aircraft that can compete with the 
incumbents’ new aircraft option. 
 
Game 6: New Entrant, -15% Fuel Intensity 
Due to limited design and production experience, a new entrant may not be able to match the incumbents’ new 
aircraft option performance. For this game, it is assumed that the new entrant is only able to develop an aircraft that 
matches the performance of the incumbents’ re-engined aircraft (i.e. a 15% fuel burn improvement). A different off-
symmetric equilibrium is shown in Table 12. Player B develops a new aircraft to maintain a 50% market share while 
Players A and C split the remaining market by offering an aircraft with an inferior performance to Player B’s.  
The new entrant only receives a positive payoff if 
neither incumbent develops a new aircraft. This result 
suggests that a profit-maximizing firm would decide to not 
enter the market. Therefore, incumbent manufacturers may 
not need to be concerned with new entrants unless there is 
a threat that they could match or exceed the performance 
of the incumbents’ new aircraft option. But, if a new 
entrant has government support, it may be profitable to 
enter the market. Further, if the new entrant has a different 
objective function than the incumbents’, spillover effects 
to other sectors of the economy, national pride, or other 
factors may make it beneficial to enter the market. Therefore, when determining the likelihood of a new competitor 
entering the market, additional factors must be taken into account.  
The three-player static games have shown how differences in the investment required by incumbent players may 
result in off-symmetric game equilibriums as well as how new competition in addition to increased expected fuel 
prices may shift the competitive equilibrium. 
 
C. Dynamic Games 
If manufacturers consider how their decision in the present impact future product line decisions, the game can be 
modeled dynamically where the evolution of demand and fuel prices impacts the equilibrium strategy set. 
Committing to a re-engined or new aircraft locks into a technology level for 10 or more years, requires an 
investment, and can be risky. Delaying the decision provides more flexibility for future actions, but gives 
competitors an opportunity to develop a superior aircraft. If it is assumed that both incumbent manufacturers will 
decide to proceed with a new aircraft by the third stage (i.e. 2020-24), a dynamic game (as depicted in Figure 4) can 
be evaluated to understand the timing of the decision, given the competitive scenarios developed in this section.  
 
Game 7: Two-Player Dynamic Game 
The dynamic game was constructed to have 
four stages, 2010-14, 2015-19, 2020-24, and 
2025-2039. The incumbent manufacturers select 
the maintain, re-engine, or new strategies at each 
of the first two stages, but are forced to choose 
new in the third. It is assumed that the re-engine 
strategy is a stopgap until a new aircraft enters 
into service ten years after the re-engined aircraft. 
This creates a fourth strategy for the incumbents 
named delay. For the delay strategy, the decision 
to develop a new aircraft is delayed five years to 
Table 12: New Entrant, -15% Fuel Intensity 
  Player B 
  Maintain Re-engine New 
Pl
ay
er
 A
 Maintain 24.6, 24.6, 11 
20.8, 27.4,  
3 
17.1, 28.8, 
-5 
Re-engine 29, 20.8,  
3 
23.7, 22.2,  
-2 
17.5, 24.2,  
-8 
New 28.8, 17.1, -
5 
24.2, 16.0,  
-8 
15.1, 15.1,  
-11 
 
Table 13: Two-Player Dynamic Game 
  Player B 
  Maintain Re-engine New Delay 
Pl
ay
er
 A
 Maintain 
38, 38 30, 39 35, 34 29, 48 
Re-engine 40, 30 31, 30 28, 34 31, 37 
New 34, 35 34, 26 27, 27 33, 31 
Delay 48, 29 37, 30 31, 33 35, 35 
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the second stage, for entry into service in the third stage (2020-2024). 
The payoff for the new strategy was determined for the fourth stage, based on the expected demand and fuel 
prices. Increased fuel costs enabled manufacturers to increase the sale price of the new or re-engined aircraft while 
the existing aircraft sale price was assumed to hold constant in real dollar terms. Technology levels were assumed to 
improve at the rates shown in Figure 3. Therefore, delaying the decision enabled a superior aircraft to be developed 
that yielded a higher sale price, assuming the expectation of future fuel prices increased or remained constant. 
Backwards induction down each possible decision path, with each possible fuel and demand scenario, was used to 
determine the expected payoffs in present value terms in the normal form game shown in Table 13. The dynamic 
game demonstrates that delaying the development of a new aircraft to take advantage of improved technology levels 
and the increase in sale price may be the game equilibrium.  
The two-player dynamic game was repeated for each combination of the high/low fuel price and demand 
scenarios in Table 5. Higher fuel prices raise the value of fuel burn reduction technologies, enabling manufacturers 
to increase the sale price of new and re-engined aircraft, while high demand enables manufacturers to work down 
the production learning curve more rapidly and spread the fixed costs of development across more aircraft. The low 
states have the opposite effects. It was found that varying demand did not alter the outcomes of the dynamic game, 
whereas the low fuel price scenarios resulted in both players selecting the maintain strategy. Therefore, as in the 
static game, the expectation of higher fuel costs drives manufacturers to develop a new aircraft. This is a result of 
the aircraft program valuation model’s greater sensitivity to price than demand, as shown in Figure 6. All dynamic 
game results displayed were found using the expectation of increasing fuel costs. 
 
Game 8: New Entrant Dynamic Game, -25% Fuel Intensity 
The dynamic game was played with a new entrant to the market in the 2015-19 time frame. This analysis 
enabled the understanding of how new competition – or the credible threat of new competition – may change the 
dynamic game. As in the static games in Table 11 and Table 12, the level of performance of the new entrant’s 
aircraft impacted the outcome of the game. A new entrant’s aircraft with the same performance as the incumbents’ 
new option would take significant market share unless the incumbents move, while a new entrant’s aircraft that has 
the same performance as the incumbents’ re-engined aircraft would capture less market share. 
Table 14 shows that there are potentially two 
pure strategy equilibriums. While the 
incumbents may find it most profitable to 
harvest their existing product lines, there is an 
incentive for one incumbent to develop a new 
aircraft, but not both. The incumbents play a 
waiting game, with the first one to move taking 
the risk of developing a new aircraft along with 
a higher expected payoff, while the other stands 
pat with the less risky maintain strategy. To 
determine which manufacturer is likely to move 
first would require information regarding the 
incumbent manufacturer’s assessment of the 
probability of a new entrant and the new 
entrant’s aircraft performance. The manufacturer that believes it is more likely that a new competitor will enter the 
market with a competitive aircraft will be the first to move, resulting in the late mover delaying the introduction of 
their new aircraft until the fourth stage (2025-29). The payoffs for the first mover to select the new or delay strategy 
are very close, with payoffs that are sensitive to the assumptions of the aircraft program valuation model. Therefore, 
the timing of the first incumbent new aircraft may be either the second (2015-19) or third stage (2020-24). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 14: New Entrant 2015 Dynamic Game, -25% Fuel 
Intensity 
  Player B 
  Maintain Re-engine New Delay 
Pl
ay
er
 A
 
Maintain 16.7, 16.7, 
20.6 
16.7, 13.7, 
13.9 
16.7, 19.7, 
2.7 
16.7, 19.9, 
11.5 
Re-engine 15.2, 16.7, 
13.9 
15.2, 13.7, 
7.5 
15.2, 16.4, 
-0.4 
15.2, 18.3, 
6.8 
New 19.7, 16.7, 
2.7 
16.4, 13.7, 
-0.4 
11.9, 11.9, 
0.7 
14.8, 15.0, 
3.6 
Delay 19.9, 16.7, 
11.5 
18.3, 13.7, 
6.8 
15.0, 14.8, 
3.6 
15.0, 15.0, 
10.3 
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Game 9: New Entrant Dynamic Game, -15% Fuel Intensity 
If a new entrant is expected to develop an 
aircraft that has the same performance as the 
incumbents’ re-engined aircraft, the incumbents 
have an incentive to develop a new aircraft, as 
shown in Table 15. The Nash equilibrium is 
predicted to be the case were either Player A or 
B enters a new aircraft into service in 2015-19 
while the other delays until 2020-24. Player C 
gains less market share than required to have a 
positive E(NPV), suggesting an early move by 
one of the incumbents could prevent the new 
competitor from entering the market. The 
incumbent that delays entry into service of a 
new aircraft temporarily loses market share 
while it produces an aircraft inferior to the new entrant and the other incumbent, regaining market share in the third 
stage (2020-25) when it introduces a new, superior aircraft. If both incumbents delay the entry into service of a new 
aircraft, the new entrant is able to capture significant market share in the short term, increasing its payoff, and the 
likelihood of entry.  
 The three-player dynamic games are sensitive to the aircraft program valuation model and market share 
assumptions, but are used here to demonstrate how the credible threat of new competition may lead incumbent 
manufacturers to select different strategies depending on their own risk tolerance and assessment of the threat of 
new competition. 
 
D. Discussion 
  The static Games 1 to 6 demonstrated the impact of different scenarios on the single-aisle aircraft 
manufacturer’s competitive game. Dynamic decision-based analysis was introduced to combine multiple factors in 
Games 7 to 9, demonstrating how a game theory analysis of the single aisle aircraft market segment may be used to 
determine the optimal timing of manufacturer’s strategies. Table 16 summarizes the games discussed, showing that 
while subsidies or expected increasing fuel prices may incentivize the development of new aircraft, consideration of 
longer-term strategies in the dynamic game may provide incentives for manufacturers to delay the entry of a new 
aircraft. This may result in superior performing aircraft that enter into service in the next decade, at the cost of 
increased carbon emissions in the near-term. Kar (2010) showed that early entry into service of available technology 
(as opposed to delaying entry for more advanced technologies) has greater potential to improve fleet fuel-burn 
performance due to the dynamics of fleet turnover. Therefore, public policies may be required to incentivize the 
development of new aircraft. 
VI. Conclusions 
Competition is an important factor to consider when designing policies to reduce aviation’s CO2 emissions. This 
paper has outlined a framework of analysis for the single-aisle aircraft market segment that uses an aircraft program 
valuation model and a game theoretic approach to understand the impacts of changes in the market on manufacturer 
decisions to maintain, re-engine, or develop a new aircraft. It was found that subsidies and higher fuel prices should 
provide sufficient incentives for incumbent manufacturers to develop a new aircraft. New competition in the market 
Table 15: New Entrant 2015 Dynamic Game, -15% Fuel 
Intensity 
  Player B 
  Maintain Re-engine New Delay 
Pl
ay
er
 A
 
Maintain 22.8, 22.8, 
6.1 
20.1, 21.9, 
-0.2 
17.5, 28.9, 
-6.0 
20.4, 27.9, 
0.2 
Re-engine 23.4, 20.1, 
-0.2 
20.0, 18.5, 
-4.2 
16.0, 25.6, 
-8.6 
19.7, 24.7, 
-4.5 
New 28.9, 17.5, 
-6.0 
25.6, 14.5, 
-8.6 
19.7, 19.7, 
-12.3 
24.7, 20.7, 
-10.1 
Delay 27.8, 20.4, 
0.2 
24.7, 18.2, 
-4.5 
20.7, 24.7, 
-10.1 
23.7, 23.7, 
-4.4 
 
Table 16: Summary of Game Equilibriums 
  Player B 
  Maintain Re-engine New Delay 
Pl
ay
er
 A
 
Maintain (1) Low Fuel prices   (8) Dynamic Game (New Entrant, -25%) 
Re-engine (5) New Entrant, -25% 
Performance 
(2) Technology Forcing 
Regulations 
(6) New Entrant, -15% 
Performance  
New   (3) Subsidies (4) High Fuel Prices 
(9) Dynamic Game 
(New Entrant, -15%) 
Delay (8) Dynamic Game 
(New Entrant, -25%)  
(9) Dynamic Game 
(New Entrant, -15%) 
(7) Dynamic Game  
(2-player) 
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segment is also likely to trigger innovation as incumbent manufacturers attempt to produce more efficient aircraft 
that maintain sales in a more competitive market. Interestingly, it was found that a new entrant’s aircraft that offers a 
fuel efficiency improvement on the order of 15% may incentivize the incumbents to develop a new aircraft while a 
new entrant with a 25% fuel burn improvement may cause incumbents to select a less risky strategy.  
A number of further complexities could be explored using the framework developed in this paper. It was 
assumed that competitors act with perfect information. Imperfect information would cast doubt on the technical 
capabilities of competitor’s aircraft as well as the financial payoffs. Incumbent manufacturers could collude either 
implicitly or explicitly to select the strategy that yields the highest total payoffs with least risk, avoiding Prisoner’s 
Dilemmas. Further, it was assumed that all manufacturers are risk neutral and have the same objective function – to 
maximize expected net present value of a program. But aircraft manufactures have different corporate cultures and 
the aerospace industry has spill over effects that impact other sectors of a nations economy, providing incentives for 
governments to subsidize new aircraft programs that may otherwise not be profit maximizing.  
This work is an initial step in using game theory to understand the impacts of competition and market conditions 
on large commercial aircraft manufacturers’ decisions to innovate. A number of simplifying assumptions have been 
made in the models presented to facilitate the analysis of a problem that quickly scales in complexity. To tackle this 
problem in a more holistic manner, a multidisciplinary approach should be implemented in which the technical and 
financial implications of strategic options are integrated into the decision making process. The question of what 
level of performance to design into the next generation aircraft has a continuous solution set, not the three-pronged 
strategy set used in this paper. The technical risk of increasing performance of a new aircraft impacts the financial 
risk of the program, while external market conditions outside of the control of managers will ultimately determine 
the success of a new program. Therefore, manufacturers and policy makers will require more complex and 
integrated tools to understand the implications of their decisions and to tackle aviation’s environmental challenges. 
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Appendix 
A. Market Share Assumptions 
 The average market share assumptions for the three player games are shown in Table 17 and Table 18. The 
market share assumptions differ based on the assumed performance of the new entrant’s aircraft. If the new entrant 
produces an aircraft of equivalent performance to the incumbent’s new aircraft option, the market would be evenly 
split three ways if all manufacturers select the new strategy. If the new entrant produces an aircraft of equivalent 
performance to the incumbent’s re-engined aircraft, the market is evenly split three ways if the incumbents select the 
re-engine strategy. 
 
 
Table 17: Three Player Game Market Share Rules 
New Entrant Performance = Incumbent New (-25%) 
  Player B 
  Maintain Re-engine New 
Pl
ay
er
 A
 Maintain 15%, 15%, 70% 
15%, 25%, 
60% 
15%, 43%, 
43% 
Re-engine 25%, 15% 
60% 
25%, 25%, 
50% 
25%, 38%, 
38% 
New 43%, 15%, 
43% 
38%, 25%, 
38% 
33%, 33%, 
33% 
 
Table 18: Three Player Game Market Share Rules  
New Entrant Performance = Incumbent Re-engined (-15%) 
  Player B 
  Maintain Re-engine New 
Pl
ay
er
 A
 Maintain 25%, 25%, 50% 
20%, 40%, 
40% 
15%, 55%, 
30% 
Re-engine 40%, 20% 
40% 
33%, 33%, 
33% 
25%, 50%, 
25% 
New 55%, 15%, 
30% 
50%, 25%, 
25% 
40%, 40%, 
20% 
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